Oil Gas Management The WritePass Journal

Oil Gas Management Abstract Oil Gas Management ; however, the Macando well unexpectedly took a longer period. By the 20th April, the day that there was the blowout, which killed eleven individuals, the rig was already late by 43 days, and this would have led to an extra cost of 21 million dollars in lease fees only. There is a danger that those who are responsible for making decisions to stop operations could feel economic pressure not to do so if was possible. Catastrophic BOP’s failure The last defense line against the Macondo incident was a device known as the ‘blind shear ram’, which is part of the BOP found on top of the wellhead, and more than a mile below the ocean floors’ surface. If the oil’s upward pressure and the gas that is in the reservoir became more than the heavy drilling fluid’s downward pressure, and all the other resources for controlling the well failed to operate, the two blades of the blind shear ram, were expected to slice through the pipe of the drill and then help in sealing the well. If the BOP had worded as expected, the whole incident would not have occurred and all the lives would not have been lost. Taking into account the single blind-shear ram’s failure to run the blowout preventer of the Deepwater Horizon, which appeared to be one of the major causes of the blowout of the well of Macondo, it was recommended that the Safety and Health Executive particularly review the case for prescription that the United Kingdom Continental Shelf’s blowout preventers are well equipped with the two blind shear ram. Whereas the flexibility of the safety regulation regime of the United Kingdom seemed to have performed properly, it was also been seen that for fail-safe devices like blowout preventer, the administration or the government has adopted minimum, strict standards of safety or show that these would not actually be an economical, last-resort against catastrophes. Importance of simple checks An appraisal of the two pods of control on the BOP of the Deep-water Horizon as a result of the incident showed that there was an error in a vital valve in one of the pods of control, and that the other pod of control did not have adequate charge on the batteries; it is believed that these faults were there during the time that the accident happened. There was at least a single working control pod needed to run the automatic mode function that would have helped in closing up the BOP. The automatic mode function should have taken place in an automatic manner, without being aided, when the hydraulic line together with the electric cables were destroyed in the explosion. The automatic mode function is a very important system of backup. It is of great concern that the simple failures of various systems were not identified during the process of inspection. As a consequence, a programme has been implemented across the global drilling operation to make sure that the equipment operates the way it is designed to do. Another thing that has been done to ensure that such preventable incidences do not repeat include fundamentally improving the testing procedures of the blowout preventers, which consists of making sure that the systems of backup work and are properly tested in the process of drilling a well. This is another instance of the industry giving a response to an accident instead of anticipating a possible problem, even though the new regime is highly welcome. It is believed that the authorities have to make sure that the offshore inspection regime of the United Kingdom could not be susceptible to simple faults like having a battery that does not have sufficient charge, to go without being noticed. Need to protect the whistle-blowers Owing to the immense economic pressure of keeping a drilling rig functional, it is of great concern to various stakeholders that the workers who attempt to talk about safety matters might be or even feel like they are intimidated by their seniors. The whistle-blowers are not in a position of calling a halt or bringing to a stop some things and the managers and clearly attempting to make money for the organization. Their primary responsibility is not protecting the environment. Some contradicting reports were found from the HSE regarding harassment and aggravation on the rigs as well as the industry’s assurances that honest whistleblowers will be given a hearing and protection. The government has also ensured that there are discussions with the unions and industry about the further actions that are required for the prevention of representatives of safety from feeling or being intimidated by their seniors such that they do not report a danger. Conclusion Following the fatal incidence that occurred in the Mexican Gulf, it is important that there is clarity on the hierarchy and identity of the liable stakeholders to make sure that the government, and thus the taxpayers, doe not need to pay for the outcomes of the offshore accidents. Any lack of hierarchy and clarity on the liability will hamper the compensation payment to those that are affected by the incident of the offshore. It is recommended that it needs to be a requirement of the process of licensing that it proves their capability to pay for the outcomes of any incident that could happen. 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